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Incorporating *Empire*

Comment

NKRUMAH WINS

THE Gold Coast has voted for FREEDOM. On every page of the Convention People's Party's election manifesto the word occurs: *Vote 104—FREEDOM, VOTE FOR KWAME NKRUMAH, the idol of Ghana, 104—FREEDOM! Long Live Our Great Incorruptible Leader KWAME NKRUMAH, Forward to Victory with the Common People, FREEDOM! FREEDOM!! FREEDOM!!!*—these were the slogans of the party that won 71 out of the 104 seats in the new Assembly. Freedom from what? Imperialism still lived in the election propaganda. It is dead now. The officials have left the Cabinet. The British Government has announced to the United Nations that within a few years it will be constitutionally impossible for it to retain its present Trusteeship Agreement for the government of Togoland. Within a 'measurable' time the Gold Coast will be self-governing and making its claim to Commonwealth membership. The era of pure nationalism is over.

How does the Gold Coast face the future? The new Government is in a very strong position. Dr. Nkrumah has achieved the feat of winning his second election—always more difficult than winning the first. The Opposition is divided between the Northern People's Party, the Togoland Congress, the Ghana Congress, the Muslim Association Party, and independents, including a handful of ex-C.P.P. rebels. Although together they polled a heavy vote, they did so for a variety of reasons which do not add up to a coherent policy or provide the basis for a united party. Dr. Nkrumah has no doubt already taken warning from the successes of the regional groups in the North and in Togoland. They represent a tendency against

unitary government which is showing itself elsewhere in Africa and which cannot be counteracted without a liberal approach to minorities. The Ghana Congress, however, managed to gain only one seat with a programme which contained much common sense and revealed considerable knowledge of the problems with which the new Government is now faced. Its weakness was due to lack of organisation, not to inability to see the problems. True, the C.P.P. also dealt with them. Homes, health, food, schools, figure largely in its programme, and we are told that the new Government is to be Socialist in the same sense as the British Labour Party. This is easier said than done: there would be no Fabian Society if British Socialists had not realised how difficult it is. Now the Gold Coast must pay attention to its labour problems, determine the position of the co-operative movement in relation to the marketing board, raise food production, direct foreign investment into the most useful channels, devise a satisfactory system of taxation, in short, face a host of problems which require detailed analysis and a considered philosophy of social organisation. These are all subjects on which there are grounds for disagreement, and which should sort out the sheep from the goats on party lines. As long as attention was wholly concentrated on nationalist propaganda they could be largely ignored. The next phase in Gold Coast politics, should in that sense, be much healthier than the last.

Dr. Nkrumah already has an immense achievement to his credit. Despite all the bad marks—inexperience, corruption, intimidation, hero-worship, 'black' nationalism and so forth—an African Prime Minister has carried his party and his country through to the last stage before self-government and has emerged, on a democratic vote, with a majority sufficient to carry out his policy and with an opposition large enough to contest that policy if it wishes and to present an

alternative to the electorate if it can. *No other politician, black or white, has done this in Africa south of the Sahara.* There are those who see only the black spots in the record, who point to the undemocratic tendencies in African society and fear their influence on the institutions of mass democracy. These fears are justified. Failure to recognise the achievement so far is not. Every decent person will wish good luck to Dr. Nkrumah, in full knowledge of his difficulties and of the absolute necessity—for the rest of Africa as for the Gold Coast—that they should be overcome.

HOPE FOR NYASALAND

IF the policy announced in Mr. Lyttelton's statement on Nyasaland¹ is intended only as a beginning, there is new hope for Nyasaland. At present, there is still the hangover of suspicion from the imposition of Federation, and the economic advantages of Federation—which were presumed to justify the political disappointment—are still potential rather than actual. In an adjournment debate on April 15, Mr. James Johnson, M.P., emphasised the disturbing fact that 18,000 able-bodied men leave the territory as migrant labour for the mines of the Rand and the Rhodesias, leaving their families behind, with consequent disruption of domestic and tribal life. He asked for more roads and for high priority for the Shire Valley water-power scheme and the development of coal deposits. Mr. Lyttelton had nothing to say on these points. He has, however, been convinced that the *tangata* system, whereby African tenants on private estates must either pay rent in cash (recently almost trebled) or work instead, 'has outlived its usefulness.' The Governor is considering alternatives, and in particular is negotiating with some of the larger estates to acquire certain land closely occupied by tenants. Mr. Johnson had also stressed the danger in some areas where Africans are suffering from land hunger and see land owned by a white immigrant population not being fully utilised. He asked for Government acquisition of at least 500,000 acres. Mr. Lyttelton mentioned no figure, but has decided that any undeveloped and unoccupied lands must be put to use within a reasonable time or, if suitable for African settlement, they will be acquired by Government. This is a good beginning, strongly opposed by local settlers. It should be noted that it has nothing whatever to do with the economic benefits of Federation. On the contrary, it is possible because control of land is not a federal subject. The wider problem of economic develop-

ment is of federal concern. It must be vigorously tackled if the African population of Nyasaland is not to continue to be a large reservoir of cheap labour.

PRIMING THE PUMP

OF all methods of helping economic development in the Colonies, the payment of grants and loans through the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund appears to command the greatest success. This year's *Return of Schemes*¹ shows the expenditure in 1953 by the United Kingdom of £13,907,330. Since 1946, £84.9m. have been pumped into colonial territories in this way. The figures compare favourably with those published in the sixth report of the United Nations Technical Assistance Committee, which shows \$22,810,000 collected from 69 countries in 1953, of which Britain contributed £500,000. The basic idea is the same: the outside contribution is intended only to supplement the efforts a territory can make for itself. This leaves the receiving country in control of its own programme, and able to use help where it is most beneficial. Although the Colonies had difficulty in drawing up Development Plans in the absence of adequate statistics, supplies and staff, the post-war troubles appear now to be over. Large sums have been spent on research since 1946: £4.1m. in agriculture, fisheries £1.4m., £1.9m. in medicine, and so on. When the total expenditure so far committed is analysed, it is found that the largest group of grants has been spent on social services (£53.9m.), followed by economic projects (£24.5m.) and £19m. on communications. The regional breakdown shows that the lion's share (£34.8m.) has gone to West Africa, followed by East Africa (£25m.) and the Caribbean (£23m.). The grants are roughly 100 times the size of the loans. The results are now apparent. Colonial officials have paid tribute to the value of the scheme, and the most casual visitor sees the evidence in a school here, a road there, a research station or housing scheme which otherwise would not exist. Success to date justifies the renewal and expansion of assistance when the first ten-year period ends in 1956.

NOTE

READERS are reminded that there is no issue of *Venture* in August. The next number will appear on September 1.

¹ House of Commons, 24/5/54.

¹ House of Commons Paper No. 181, H.M. Stationery Office, 1s. 3d.

THE GOLD COAST AND INDEPENDENCE

by The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Listowel, P.C.¹

THE Gold Coast has reached the penultimate stage of self-government. The legislature is now entirely *representative*, as all its members have been directly elected by secret ballot and there are no longer any seats reserved for mining and commercial interests or for 'traditional' members chosen through joint councils. The Cabinet is *responsible* to the Legislative Assembly, as senior civil servants appointed by the Governor are replaced by Ministers chosen by the Prime Minister as leader of the majority party. This, of course, is the Cabinet system as we know it. The administration will act in accordance with decisions of Ministers responsible to a fully-elected legislature, and, subject to the reserve powers of the Governor, and his responsibility for public order and for the Trust Territory of Togoland, the country will have unfettered control over its internal affairs. The Minister of State said in the House of Commons on April 28, that 'these changes must be regarded as the last stage before the Gold Coast assumes full responsibility for its own affairs.' It is, therefore, clear that both here and in the Gold Coast, the next stage of constitutional development is expected to be the complete autonomy in internal and external relations characteristic of new and old nations in every part of the world.

When will this be? The date of self-government depends on a number of factors no one can predict, mainly conditions which the Gold Coast Government will wish to fulfil before it feels in a position to claim independence. But it is likely to fall within the next five years. There will be a general election in this country within two years, very probably next year. It is therefore essential for the Labour Party to decide what policy it will pursue if it is in power at the moment of the transfer of British power to the Gold Coast. The purpose of this article is to suggest a policy that may assist in the consideration of this vital matter. We all know the danger of 'snap' decisions by Ministers who have not thought out their policy in advance. Such a danger can only be avoided

if colonial policy is as carefully worked out as domestic policy before the next election.

No colonial issue will have more influence on the reputation of another Labour Government, or affect more profoundly the relations between this country and the non-European races in the Commonwealth, than the future of the Gold Coast. The success of the 1945 Government in bringing India, Pakistan and Ceylon into equal partnership with the old countries of the Commonwealth was probably the most outstanding of its achievements. A similar success in the Gold Coast will redound to the credit of another British Government. From the standpoint of race relations its significance can hardly be over-estimated. No African dependency of the United Kingdom has yet become independent. African opinion therefore regards the Gold Coast as the acid test of British good faith. It would do more than anything else to retrieve in East and Central Africa the goodwill we have lost through Federation, the Mau Mau revolt and the deposition of the Kabaka. It would also convince the Asian members of the Commonwealth that we mean to end colonialism in Africa as well as in Asia. These are the considerations that render our future relations with the Gold Coast of such transcendent importance.

Conditions of Independence

Let me now turn to the conditions which the Gold Coast will wish to satisfy before it claims independence within the Commonwealth. This will show clearly the policy we should follow in order to assist in the fulfilment of these conditions. We must be thinking at the same time of how to enable the Gold Coast, when it becomes a self-governing country, to be an equal partner among the free countries of the Commonwealth. It is essential for the Gold Coast Government to acquire the capacity of assuming the power now vested in the Governor appointed by the British Government. The Governor himself must naturally become a powerless figurehead, appointed on the advice of the Gold Coast Government. This means not only a change in law, which is easily made, but an assumption of administrative responsibilities, and a training of local personnel to discharge these responsibilities, which will take some little time to bring about. For example, a country can

¹ Lord Listowel was the last Secretary of State for India and the last Secretary of State for Burma. From 1948-1950 he was Minister of State for Colonial Affairs. He is a member of the Advisory Committee of the Fabian Colonial Bureau.

hardly be called independent until it controls its own judiciary and higher civil service and has the trained diplomats to man at least a few key missions abroad. I remember the difficulty, when India and Pakistan became independent, of finding Indians and Pakistanis for posts overseas. I hope we shall help in the training of personnel for a foreign and Commonwealth service and Public Service Commissions have been set up to advise the Governor about the appointment of judges and civil servants, and when these Commissions have had sufficient experience, they will doubtless be able to take over the functions of the Governor. This will safeguard the independence of the Public Services, while placing them under local control.

Togoland presents a different problem because the Governor's power in relation to a Trust Territory cannot be transferred without the consent of the United Nations.¹ The section of Togoland for which we are responsible is now administered as part of the Gold Coast, but it will obviously be impossible for us to administer it in this way when our authority has been removed. We should do our utmost to persuade the United Nations to accept an alteration in the present Trusteeship Agreement, and to admit the Gold Coast, as soon as it becomes independent, as a member of the United Nations. Provided we do our best in that direction, no one in West Africa will doubt the sincerity of our purpose. Legislation will, of course, be required here before the Gold Coast becomes independent. But, judging from the Indian Independence Act, which was drafted and passed through Parliament in less than two months, such legislation can be speedily enacted if it is agreed between the British parties. If there is no agreement, as in the case of the Burma Act, the necessary legislation only takes two or three months longer. It is, therefore, the action of the Gold Coast Government in preparing for and discharging the functions of self-government and not the action of the United Kingdom Government in divesting itself of authority, that will decide how soon the Gold Coast becomes a free nation.

The Commonwealth

But if we have the power to transfer the authority of the British Parliament to the Legislative Assembly in the Gold Coast, we have not the power to oblige other members of the Commonwealth to treat the Gold Coast as an equal partner. What does equality between Commonwealth countries mean? It means at least the right to attend conferences of Commonwealth Ministers—above all, conferences of Prime Ministers—and to receive

the information circulated by Commonwealth Governments to each other on the highest level.

It has already been said by the present Government that they will consult the other Commonwealth Governments, when the time comes, about the equal status of the Gold Coast. I hope that we shall do much more than that. We should use the influence of our seniority and long experience to convince them that the Gold Coast should be treated in the same fashion as India, Pakistan and Ceylon. We should urge them as soon as possible to declare their willingness to recognise the Gold Coast as a full member of the Commonwealth at the moment it becomes an independent nation. These two events should be simultaneous. If they do not coincide the Gold Coast will start, inevitably, to drift away. Even if a 'two-tier' Commonwealth were feasible for a time, it would end, sooner or later, in the breaking away of those countries occupying a position of inferiority.

If every Commonwealth country were to agree about the admission of the Gold Coast, no problem would arise, but even if one or more countries were to disagree, the day would be far from lost. When friends differ, they meet to discuss their differences. In this way, major differences are often resolved. This has happened again and again in relations between Commonwealth Governments. For example, when India became a Republic, it was by no means certain that every Commonwealth Government would regard republicanism as consistent with being a member of a Commonwealth united by the Crown. But after the Prime Ministers had met to discuss their constitutional difficulties, they were unanimous in finding a new formula for the Crown relationship which made it possible for India to stay in the family.

It is sometimes not fully realised that there is no vote at these Commonwealth Ministerial Conferences. It follows that the Gold Coast could neither be excluded by the veto of a single country nor admitted by a majority decision. If the Conference dealing with the admission of the Gold Coast broke up without agreement the whole Commonwealth would suffer. At the worst, dissentient countries might secede. It is this knowledge of the irreparable damage disagreement about the fundamental issues can do to the fabric of the Commonwealth that almost always leads to the acceptance of the majority views. Failure to secure a consensus of opinion in favour of giving the Gold Coast all the rights of a full member of the Commonwealth from the first moment of self-government would begin the end of our present multi-racial Commonwealth. This is the final, and most important, reason why there must be no failure.

¹ See page 6.

THE PROTECTION OF ABORIGINES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS

by F. van Langenhove

(*Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations*)

THERE has been much discussion lately about the protection which aboriginal populations should enjoy under the Charter of the United Nations. The impressive report published recently by the International Labour Organisation¹ on the living and working conditions of aboriginal populations in independent countries has shed more light on the question.

In the Charter of the United Nations, as well as previously in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the obligations stipulated in the interest of the native populations fall into two categories. One is of an exceptional character and affects a few populations only: it deals exclusively with the territories which have been placed under the trusteeship system. They are the former mandated territories of the League of Nations. The native populations to which the mandate system applied did not make a total of more than a few million. That number is now still smaller because the four mandated territories of the Middle East have become independent states.

In the second category there are obligations of a general character and of an extended application. In the Covenant of the League, they resulted from Article 23 (b), which read as follows: 'The members of the League undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control.' The total population to which Article 23 of the Covenant applied amounted to some 700m., a third of the total population of the globe.

The obligations of a general character are now to be found in Chapter XI of the Charter. They are somewhat more elaborated than they were before. But a new situation has arisen, as far as their implementation is concerned. Whereas no one ever disputed, at the time of the League, that the guarantees of a just treatment, provided for in Article 23 of the Covenant, covered all the native populations in general, now, in the United Nations, many members contend that this is no longer the case under the corresponding provisions of Chapter XI. When, in February, 1946, these provisions were put into force and when, accordingly, all members were requested to list the territories which came under the obligations of Chapter XI, only eight of them did so. All the 70 territories thus listed, with a few exceptions, are territories generally considered as Colonies or Protec-

torates. The other members of the United Nations, who have under their control territories with aboriginal inhabitants, contended that they did not fall under the provisions of Chapter XI; they argued that only Colonies and Protectorates fell under them. This is, of course, without any foundation whatsoever, and the Belgian Government has, in the course of these last years, repeatedly protested against such a narrow interpretation.

Actually, the words 'Colonies and Protectorates' are not to be found anywhere in the Charter. The only definition of the territories envisaged by Chapter XI is given by Article 73 in these words: 'territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.' It seems obvious that such a definition has a broader meaning than the one usually given to the words 'Colonies or Protectorates,' and that the native people in America and Asia who still practise head-hunting, or those who are officially described in a Latin-American state as 'completely savage tribes who live in isolation. . . offer armed resistance to any attempt on the part of civilised people to enter into contact with them,' should fall under it.

The Member States who use this narrow interpretation to elude their own obligations can hardly maintain that their backward native populations have already attained a full measure of self-government, or that the vast expanse of wild territories inhabited by these natives are metropolitan territories which do not come under the provisions of Chapter XI, or deny being under any obligation or trust to promote the well-being of these populations and to ensure their just treatment. The more so that many of them, namely, all the Latin-American countries who are now members of the United Nations, as well as Liberia or Ethiopia, have been members of the League of Nations. As such, they had undertaken in Article 23 of the Covenant, 'to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control.'

The Case of Liberia

Many people seem to be under the impression that this provision was just a dead letter, without any practical value. Actually, it was far from being so. Liberia, who had had some trouble about alleged slave traffic and a rough handling of some tribes under her control, had to submit to repeated investigations on the spot. Finally, in 1934, she was taken to task by Mr. Eden, before the Council of the League. Mr.

¹ *Indigenous Peoples: Living and Working Conditions of Aboriginal Populations in Independent Countries. Studies and Reports New Series No. 35, I.L.O., Geneva, 1953, 24s.*

Eden, after recalling that 'the Members of the League undertook to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of the territories under control,' made the following statement, as quoted from the official record: 'It was the will of the United Kingdom Government . . . that Liberia had so grossly failed to observe this obligation attaching to her as a Member of the League of Nations, that the League would be quite entitled to consider her expulsion under paragraph 4 of Article 16.'

Such was the importance attached by one of the principal members of the League to Article 23 of the Covenant. Surely, it can hardly be said that this was a guarantee without value for the aboriginal peoples. Now, the same undertaking, expressed in terms almost identical, is to be found in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, members who never challenged the view, in the League of Nations, that it applied to their aboriginal populations, no longer admit it under the Charter as far as they are concerned; we are thus confronted with the rather paradoxical situation that Chapter XI is fully implemented, e.g., as far as the native populations of Sierra-Leone or French Guinea are concerned, but it is deemed of no concern to the native populations of Liberia, living on the other side of the border, although they are at the same social, political or cultural level, and, in some cases, belong to the same tribes.

Surely no one can contend that the native populations in question have, since the time of the League of Nations, achieved so great a degree of progress that no international organisation needs to care about them any longer. On the contrary. This is, for instance, how the I.L.O. characterises their present situation in its report: 'As a rule the living standard of the aboriginal populations in independent countries is extremely low, and in the great majority of cases is considerably lower than that of the most needy layers of the non-indigenous population' (p. 89); many native peoples are listed in the report as being in the process of complete extinction. Or again, the Committee of Experts established by the United Nations to study the problem of slavery has recently concluded an investigation which indicates that some

native populations are the victims, in our days, of serious abuses. According to their report, slavery should not alone be a 'concern of the international community. Other forms of servitude exist in practically all regions of the world . . . the number of people affected and the suffering caused by these practices is much more significant at present than that resulting from crude slavery.' Many details about the practices referred to in this passage of the report of the Committee of Experts on Slavery will be found in the volume just published by the I.L.O. on indigenous populations. It states, for instance, that: 'personal services are still performed by the aborigines in various parts of Latin-America and India . . . often the work done by the aborigines for various institutions and persons may be regarded as a form of servitude' (p. 367).

These practices actually fall outside the provisions of the Convention for the repression of Slavery of 1926. But the narrow interpretation given by so many members of the United Nations to Chapter XI means a serious change for the worse. At the time of the League of Nations, the native populations who were victims of those forms of servitude drew at least, from Article 23 of the Covenant, a protection which, as the case of Liberia shows, was not without significance. That protection is now denied to them. Far from making a step forward, the United Nations is making a deplorable step backward in the implementation of a principle of international law, which dates back to the sixteenth century.

The prevailing tendency has been recently to focus attention on the question of independence. Certainly, it is important that there should be no delay in developing self-government. But one may well ask whether it is of less importance that among the aboriginal peoples who have been deprived of the international guarantees they enjoyed previously, many are still victims of various forms of servitude and several tribes are even under the menace of complete extinction. From a simple humanitarian point of view, we should restore to aboriginal populations, representing millions of human beings, the safeguards of which they have been deprived, and to which they are entitled under the terms of the Charter.

THE FUTURE OF TOGOLAND

ON June 21 the British Government asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include in the agenda of the Ninth Session of the U.N. General Assembly the item: 'The future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under U.K. Trusteeship.' The British Government's views were set out in a memorandum which explained that:

'When, as will happen, within a measurable period, the Gold Coast assumes full responsibility for its own affairs it will no longer be constitutionally possible for the U.K. Government to administer the Trust Territory as an integral part of the Gold Coast.'

It would be possible:

(a) to amend or replace the present Trusteeship

Agreement; or

(b) to terminate the Agreement without replacement on the grounds that the objectives of the international Trusteeship System have been substantially achieved in the Territory.'

If the second course were adopted, as favoured by the British Government,

'the territory and its peoples would pass beyond the ambit of the International Trusteeship system.'

The General Assembly is asked to ascertain the views of the inhabitants. The question impinges on that of the future of Togoland under French Trusteeship, which is outside the present discussion, and on the very difficult one of the factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not a state is independent.

PROSPECTS IN MALAYA

By Francis Carnell

Communism, colonialism and communalism are three menacing shadows hanging over Asia to-day. Communism is the special nightmare of the West, colonialism that of Asia. Somewhere in between comes communalism, which, by keeping peoples of different race or culture divided or in conflict, prevents the emergence of strongly organised states, and thus leaves the door open for either colonialism or communism. A dependent territory like Malaya, suffering as it does from all three of these diseases, is indeed in mortal peril. It is the problem colonial territory *par excellence*. Dr. Victor Purcell, in his new book *Malaya: Communist or Free?*¹ has set himself the challenging task of examining the present state of the patient's health. The result is an illuminating and provocative study, highly disturbing in its main conclusions. The fact that one who is not only a retired Malayan official of long experience, but also the only British scholar on the Chinese in South-east Asia, should have been forced to write such a belligerent polemic against British administration, must arouse acute anxiety about the whole basis of recent British policy in Malaya.

Dr. Purcell's case is that a disastrous mistake was made in appointing a soldier High Commissioner with the express purpose of subordinating all political progress to a military crusade against communism. Under General Templer Malaya has become a vast armed camp, a police state entirely dominated by the military and the special branch. Taking its tone from a brusque soldier with no time for political 'frills,' the whole spirit of British administration has become infected by a pernicious militarism. The enlightened and civilised spirit of Stamford Raffles has given way to the rigid discipline of the parade ground. Moreover, General Templer's achievement has been far from spectacular even in the military field. The shooting war is nowhere near over. According to Dr. Purcell, the falling off in terrorist 'incidents' has been due not to the High Commissioner's dynamic leadership but to the 1951 directive of the Malayan Communist Party, which laid down a new 'line' against the use of indiscriminate violence. Dr. Purcell claims that despite all the propaganda about 'winning the hearts and minds of the people,' the communists are potentially as powerful a force as ever. Malaya remains a political problem and should have been treated as a political problem.

Dr. Purcell's charge sheet is a long one. He condemns the High Commissioner for being anti-Chinese. The creation of state nationality was a sure proof of 'divide and rule.' The elected village councils are so much window dressing, since they are wholly dominated by district officers. The elected municipalities and town councils are a travesty of

representative government owing to the farcically narrow franchise. The belated admission of non-Malays to the M.C.S. in the ratio of one to four Malays is a meaningless sop, since no Chinese cadet can aspire to a senior government post for many years to come. Nothing whatever has been done about the deteriorating economic position of the Malays. Dr. Purcell roundly condemns the Templer régime, not for its brutality—for no such charge can be substantiated—but for 'its bankruptcy of imaginative resource, its stultifying reliance on threadbare platitude, its complete lack of all mental content.' He is convinced that if the policy of subordinating political to military considerations is continued, the situation in Malaya will, in time, not differ materially from Indo-China and will be just as hopeless. Police barbed wire and propaganda for democracy can never hold back communism in a colonial country which has hitherto not been allowed to practise democracy. Power must be given to Malaysians themselves, and by power, Mr. Purcell means real power at the centre.

Events have, of course, moved fast since this book was written. No one can dispute the boldness of the proposals made by the recent Rendel Report. Singapore is about to get internal self-government similar to that conferred on the Gold Coast in 1951. And the concession of a narrow elected majority to the Federal Council, though still unacceptable to the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. Alliance, is undoubtedly an important step on the road to self-government. But these belated reforms strengthen rather than weaken Dr. Purcell's case. They show that the Colonial Office has at last admitted that the military campaign against the communists must be accompanied by major political reforms. The unimaginative 'go-slow' political policy pursued for the past two and a half years by Mr. Lyttelton and General Templer has proved a failure. The great merit of Dr. Purcell's book is his insistence that self-government alone is likely to be the catalyst of Malayan unity. The argument that unity must precede political concessions, if accepted, will ultimately poison relations between Britain and Malaya, since it ceaselessly exposes us to the charge of wanting to postpone self-government because of our interest in keeping control of the country's dollar earnings. The whole of the Malayan problem undoubtedly turns on a quick hand-over of some effective power to Malaysians themselves. If the new constitutions fail in this respect, the results are likely to be disastrous.

Unfortunately, the forthcoming elections will be conducted under the shadow of the Emergency Regulations. In a police state—and Malaya is a police state whatever Dr. Purcell's critics may argue to the contrary—right-wing political organisations,

¹ Gollancz, 15s.

CIVIL SERVANTS AND POLITICS

The exclusion of civil servants from politics in colonial territories is based on a sound principle well established in Britain. The results are, however, often different. In some territories nearly all of the educated class are in the civil service, and in many cases some teachers, who in Britain are employed by local authorities, are civil servants. It also appears that colonial Governments are inclined to impose a ban on grades lower than those which are excluded from politics in the United Kingdom. Details of United Kingdom practice were given in reply to a question by Mr. Peter Freeman in the House of Commons on April 8, 1954:—

Civil Servants are divided into three main groups. In the 'Free Group' (1), members are free from all restrictions. The 'Intermediate Group' (2) are eligible for permission to engage in all political activities, national and local, except Parliamentary candidature, subject to a code of discretion. This group is subdivided as follows: (a) those with standing permission to engage in all political activities for which members of the group are eligible; (b) those who are required to seek permission individually to engage in such activities; and (c) those who are subject to special rules, notably in respect of local political activities. The third group is the 'Restricted Group' (3), members of which are debarred from engaging in national political activities, but may seek permission to engage in local political activities. The classification into groups is done by the Departments in consultation with their Departmental Whitley Councils. The provisional classification is as follows:—

Group	Non-industrial Staff	Industrial Staff	Total
(1)	270,560	427,223	697,783
(2) (a)	191,753	—	
(b)	78,299	—	278,439
(c)	8,782	—	
(3)	119,918	—	119,918
		Grand Total	1,096,140

OVERSEA CIVIL SERVICE

A change in the Colonial Service is outlined in *Reorganisation of the Colonial Service* (Colonial No. 306, H.M. Stationery Office, 1954, 4d.). It is designed to secure the position of officers of the 'unified' service who are recruited under the direction of the Secretary of State but employed by colonial governments. They will become members of an Oversea Civil Service. When a territory attains self-government, their service and pension conditions will be guaranteed by a formal agreement between the U.K.

Government and the Government of the territory. The present proposals do not preclude future development of a Commonwealth Service directly employed by the U.K. Government.

COPPERBELT AGREEMENT

As a result of the recent visit of Sir William Lawther, ex-President of the British National Union of Mineworkers, a positive advance has been made in the relations between European and African mineworkers in Northern Rhodesia, as shown by the two resolutions printed below:—

1. This meeting of representatives of the European Mineworkers' Union and the African Mine Workers' Union held on the 24th March, 1954, at Kitwe, Northern Rhodesia, under the Chairmanship of Sir William Lawther, Secretary-Treasurer of the Miners' International Federation,

Being of the opinion that it is in the interests of the workers within the Mining Industry of Northern Rhodesia that there be the closest possible collaboration between all workers irrespective of race,

Decides that there shall be constituted a Joint Consultative Committee composed of an equal number of representatives of the European Mine Workers' Union and the African Mine Workers' Union.

The Joint Consultative Committee shall examine any matter submitted by either of the two Miners' Organisations affecting any section of or all the miners within the Industry.

The Joint Consultative Committee shall be empowered to hold regular meetings or upon the request of either of the two unions. It shall be presided over by a representative of the European and African Unions alternatively, and shall have Joint Secretaries.

The Miners' International Federation pledges itself to assist by all the means in its power the aspirations and aims of the mineworkers in Northern Rhodesia who are its affiliates.

2. This first meeting of the Joint Consultative Committee composed of representatives of the European Miners' Union and the African Mine Workers' Union held on the 24th March, 1954, in Kitwe, Northern Rhodesia, under the Chairmanship of Sir William Lawther, Secretary-Treasurer of the Miners' International Federation:—

- (a) Recognised the validity of the African Mineworkers' aspiration for advancement in the industry and pledges on behalf of both associated mineworkers' unions to strive unceasingly and with all effort in order to realise this just demand.
- (b) It further recognises that in the interest of the maintenance and the improvement of the living standards of all mineworkers the principle of equal pay for equal work and responsibility must apply within the Mining Industry of Northern Rhodesia.

OPINION

Nigeria will soon be holding a federal general election, with responsible Governments in power in its three Regions and the Cameroons. What will the changes mean for the ordinary man and woman in the country? We print below extracts from an article by the General Secretary of the Public Utility, Technical and General Workers' Union and from a letter published in an Enugu weekly paper.

1. The Worker

'Here it is necessary to examine what part the worker has been playing in all these changes and what is his future in such a changing country. . .

We have always taken part in demonstrations. We have voted our present politicians into power and we have contributed financially to organisations which have been championing the struggle for self-government. We have patronised newspapers owned by politicians even though these are their private business enterprises. We did this because we believed that these newspapers have been exposing the evils of British imperialism. However, it is difficult to believe that the politicians appreciate our contributions. . .

The reader will be tempted to ask whether there are no trade unions in the country. Definitely there are, but they are so weak that it is sometimes better to assume that there is no trade union movement.

Main cause for this weakness is that politicians gained a strong influence in the movement after the 1945 General Strike, the first major strike in the history of this country. Workers generally pay more attention to these politicians than to the trade union leaders. As Nigeria is a colonial territory and the main struggle is always for self-government, workers tend to devote more energy to that with the belief that our economic distresses will end with achievement of this goal. Therefore, there is little time to give to union work.

There are now some signs of a change of outlook. This is due to the fact that the increased responsibilities given to our statesmen have not produced any change for the better for the workers. In fact, all indications are that conditions may become worse for us.

Now much work and responsibility devolves on the shoulders of the trade union leader. He must educate his members that the struggle for bread and butter will be a bitter one, that the end of British imperialism does not mean the end of all our ills. . .

With the increase in trade and industry the working population grows rapidly. If these workers are not organised, there is the danger that they will always be at the mercy of callous politicians. This is true also if they are organised into very weak unions.

It is therefore vitally necessary for the workers to have a strong and independent trade union movement. . .

In a fast-developing country like Nigeria the worker has an important part to play in national affairs. But with his present strength it is not possible for him to do much, as he is at the mercy of outside influences such as the politicians within the country and the Communists from abroad.

If we are to be counted among the free trade union movements of the world, then we need assistance now from the more developed trade unions in the free world. This is an urgent matter which should receive serious and urgent attention.'

F. O. Porbeni
West African Worker, March, 1954.

2. The Voter

'For the first time in history, we in the Eastern Region of Nigeria are moving toward full realisation of the ideals of democracy. Now every adult citizen of the East can be sure that his vote would be reckoned with in assessing who and who should go to represent him in the nation's highest assembly.

I have discussed this matter with some people, including women. The questions some of them asked were: "How much will one pay to register? What will one be paid when he votes for a candidate?" These questions no doubt came as a result of the dangerous precedent laid by the old "Electoral College" system. . . We must try to realise this: that while it was easy to corrupt or influence a handful of voters in the old system, it is not such an easy matter to do so in the universal adult suffrage system. One need not pay anything to register his name, and the tax qualification has been removed. Every normal adult of the age of 21 can just vote. . .

A general election should interest every adult because it is one which concerns the destiny of the nation. Our interest in it should be natural and patriotic, not vested. . .

We cannot at the present state of our development expect universal adult suffrage to work as smoothly as it does in Britain to-day, but all the same, it is bound to carry in its introduction a great wave of national consciousness and political education, and very soon the masses will get used to it. . . We must realise that the political experiences this nation is enjoying to-day took the nations from whom we learn hundreds of years of trial and error. . .

What does "Universal Adult Suffrage" then mean to us? It is this—that every normal adult in the East, man or woman, rich or poor, of every tribe, of every shade of opinion, of every creed, can come forward and, like the Greek citizen of old, contribute his own little quota in shaping the destiny of his nation.'

L. D. O. Ezechukwu, Onitsha.
Eastern Outlook and Cameroons Star,
May 27, 1954. 189

Parliament

Report of the Constitutional Commission, Singapore. In reply to a question by Mr. Braine, Mr. Hopkinson said that with only one important exception, all the recommendations of the Commission had been accepted. The two main recommendations were for a Legislative Assembly consisting of a Speaker, three ex-officio members, four nominated unofficial members, and 25 elected members; and for a Council of Ministers consisting of three ex-officio and six elected Ministers. The one important recommendation of the Commission which had not been accepted was that the Speaker should be elected by the Legislative Assembly from a panel of candidates chosen by the Governor. Instead, the first Speaker would be directly appointed by the Governor and it would be left for further consideration what other method of appointment, if any, should be adopted later. (May 19.)

Education in Tanganyika. In reply to a question by Mr. James Johnson, Mr. Lyttelton stated that the current ten-year plan for African education aimed to expand primary education to the greatest extent that the Territory's resources allowed, while at the same time increasing secondary, technical and higher education to preserve a balanced development. The proportions of school-age children who were receiving full-time education during 1953 were: European: Primary, 94 per cent.; Secondary, 95 per cent.; Total, 2,324. Asian: Primary, 97 per cent.; Secondary, 46 per cent.; Total, 16,835. African: Primary, 31 per cent.; Total, 247,173.

Mr. Lyttelton added that there were no figures available of the total number of African children of secondary school age. 2,833 were attending schools in 1953; in addition some 23,000 pupils were attending district and middle schools which provided education between standards V and VIII, that was the fifth year to eighth year of schooling. Facilities in these schools were being rapidly expanded and would soon be reflected in increased candidates for secondary education and also certain forms of vocational and technical training. Facilities for higher education for both Africans and Asians were available at the University College of Makerere in Uganda, and the aim was to enter 200 Tanganyika students there by 1956. Facilities were available for students of all races to attend higher education courses in this country and elsewhere, and the Government awarded scholarships to outstanding students for this purpose. The Royal Technical College at Nairobi would provide advanced technical training for students of all races. (May 26.)

Loans to Africans in Kenya. Mr. James Johnson asked what steps were being taken to develop commerce and industry by means of low credit loans to Africans who were deemed credit-worthy applicants. Mr. Lyttelton replied that last October, the Kenya

Government amended the African District Councils Ordinance so far as to enable such councils to create funds from local revenue for lending money to African traders. The Government would then contribute to each fund on a pound-for-pound basis up to a maximum of £5,000. So far three of the four district councils in Nyanza Province had started funds of this kind, and it was hoped that, if these experiments were successful, other local government bodies would be encouraged to join the Government in organising similar funds. (May 27.)

Constitutional Development in South-east Asia. Mr. Sorensen asked what further consideration had been given to constitutional revision in Borneo and Sarawak; and how far this had been related to constitutional development in Malaya and Singapore and the desirability or otherwise of a South-east Asian Federation. Mr. Lyttelton replied that constitutional changes designed to associate the people more closely with the government of the Colony were being discussed in Sarawak. No changes were at present contemplated for North Borneo, where the amendment of 1950 met existing needs. Any close relation of the constitutional development of the Borneo territories with that of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore was precluded by the differences between the political progress so far achieved in the two areas. Similarly, federation in any form, though it might become possible in the future, was not a practical proposition now. (June 2.)

Regional Co-operative Bank in E. Nigeria. Mr. Beswick asked whether Mr. Lyttelton had noted the inauguration of the Regional Co-operative Bank; and whether he would bring to the notice of those colonial territories which were as yet without a similar institution the value which such a bank could be to the development of their respective economies. Mr. Lyttelton said that he had noted with interest the establishment of this bank but he did not feel that any special action was necessary. (June 2.)

Deportation and Restriction Powers in the Colonies. Mr. Brockway asked which colonial governments had agreed to provide by legislation that judicial processes should normally be obligatory before a British subject or British protected person was deported from or rusticated within the territory; and how many had so far not agreed. Mr. Lyttelton replied that all territories except 18 had legislation in this sense with reference to both deportation from and restriction within the territory. The position with regard to the remaining 18 was as follows: Four had legislation with reference to deportation only. Four were prepared to legislate with reference to deportation and restriction. Three were prepared to legislate with reference to deportation only. Seven for various reasons desired to retain powers of deportation and restriction without judicial process. (June 2.)

Guide to Books

The Peoples of the Soviet Far East

By Walter Kolarz. (George Philip and Son, Ltd., 15s. 6d.)

Mr. Kolarz continues, in this book, his study of Russia and her Colonies. But the Soviet Far East, a vast area stretching from the Bering Straits to Vladivostok, and which contains one republic, Yakutia, as big as India, is so sealed off from the rest of the world that accurate, recent information is very difficult to get. The American consulate general, last diplomatic representative of the West, was closed by Soviet request in 1948, and official Soviet sources are neither generous nor complete. Mr. Kolarz admits to 'enormous gaps' in his sources, yet unless one has followed in his footsteps, painfully sifting every grain of information from reports, novels, plays and even from those sinister 'omissions,' it would be unwise to question his carefully documented facts, whatever conclusions may be drawn from them.

For the anthropologist and the student of colonial affairs, Mr. Kolarz makes the subject fascinating and the gaps tantalising. For instance, the problem of the social and monetary significance of cattle among certain African tribes reappears among the Koryaks, where it is accounted 'a sin to sell a living reindeer.' Even some of our precipitate development schemes would appear to be mirrored in Soviet colonial experience: the calamitous reduction of numbers, for instance, in State reindeer farms in the Koryak National Area. In the earlier years of the Communist régime, under the knowledge and influence of Professor Bogoraz, the Committee of the North aimed at a wise protection of the aboriginal peoples of the East, allowing only doctors, technicians and anthropologists into those areas. This has now given way to the more familiar pattern of assimilation even at the cost of extinction. Mr. Kolarz summarises the measures leading to national oppression which are now in operation. These, he says, are: (1) industrialisation and detribalisation; (2) the destruction of native economy by State interference, either by the fostering of class warfare or by direct confiscation of property and liquidation of persons; (3) persecution of local beliefs, and prohibition of cultural and political integration of similar tribes; (4) imposition of an alien language and culture and suppression of local tradition. Above all, Mr. Kolarz thinks that mass colonisation by Europeans is a factor in disrupting the peoples of the East.

Within her own borders the Soviet Union would appear to have no doubts about the superiority of the Russian people. In 1950, the All Union Academy of Sciences published an important work, *The Progressive influence of the great Russian nation on the development of the Yakut people*. Its tone of patronising condescension could not have been adopted by our most rabid jingoists without causing violent opposition. Colonisation in the Far East is encouraged not only by a 'Go East Young Man' mystique,

reminiscent of American Covered Wagon mythology, but also by solid economic advantages. Where these fail to attract, both convict and military settlement are used. Mr. Kolarz points out that Asiatic immigration is now severely restricted in the Pacific areas, and the Soviet is in fact practising a 'White Australia policy' in relation to Japanese, Chinese and Koreans. It is here faced with a conflict between the theory of international communism and the security needs of a nationalist great power. The conflict appears even more pronounced in the case of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, annexed under the terms of the Yalta Agreement.

Mr. Kolarz concludes that while even Soviet Russia cannot totally eliminate geography—the effects of distance and the mental and physical climates in which her diverse peoples live—yet Communism cannot aim at the preservation of national groups. Their right to exist depends on their contribution to Communism. In other words, this is a form of 'mercantilism' long given up by enlightened colonial powers in other parts of the world.

Molly Mortimer.

Basuto Soldiers in Hitler's War

By Brian Gray. (Basutoland Government, no price given.)

Inevitably this book invites comparison with the war history of the Bechuana,¹ and readers of *Venture* will be disappointed to find no comment on the reactions of the Basuto to the stresses of prolonged war service in Europe and the Levant. The author, however, disarms this criticism in advance: the book, he tells us, is intended 'primarily for Basuto readers,' and for this purpose it is a straightforward, simply-written record of the 52 companies recruited from the Basuto people. Indeed, the style of writing seems specially designed for translation into Sesuto, but we are not told whether the Basutoland Government is publishing a Sesuto edition. The book is well illustrated and provided with an unusually good series of maps, but the author might surely have avoided the juxtaposition of dates and Company numbers, and so spared the reader such annoyance as '... finish the war in 1944. Once more 1943 were with the Canadians ...' And why is the title spelt 'Basotho' on the front cover, while on the spine and elsewhere the more usual spelling is used?

The record is one of which the Basuto nation may well be proud. Over 21,000 enlisted, and 1,105 lost their lives—the great majority of these in the torpedoing of a troopship in the Mediterranean. Fourteen decorations were awarded. If proof were needed of the versatility of the African soldier, and of the capacity of Africans to rise to the demands of a modern mechanised civilisation, it is to be found in the catalogue of jobs performed by the Basuto. Like

¹ *Ten Thousand Men of Africa*, reviewed July, 1953.

the Bechuana, in addition to the normal tasks of Pioneers, they were used to dilute British artillery, smoke and salvage units, but they were also called on for more skilled employment. The Basuto operated map printing presses, and machinery for making and filling petrol cans; they manned telephone line construction sections and Army fire brigades; they serviced tanks, and assembled crated lorries; and they manned the mule transport of a mountain artillery regiment in the Appenines. In this way, thousands of Basuto must have acquired a variety of technical skills that would have value in industry. There can be little scope in Basutoland for such employment, and in the Union, where so many of them go to work, they will be up against the colour bar. What is the Basutoland Government doing to ensure that this valuable asset is not wasted?

Lucan.

SHORT NOTICES

Kenya's Warning, by Dr. Christopher Wilson. (African and Colonial Press Agency, 12s. post free.) Dr. Wilson does not like attacks on the Kenya settlers. He lashes out indiscriminately against all the critics of their policy, showing little understanding of the fact that moderate liberal opinion, not only the 'lunatic fringe,' is often deeply shocked by the kind of defence that settlers' spokesmen think it is appropriate to make. This is a pity, because Dr. Wilson has some points which would receive serious consideration if they were temperately expressed and separated from the parts of the book that can only be described as offensive.

Progress of Literacy in Various Countries. (No. VI in *Monographs on Fundamental Education Series*, UNESCO, 8s. 6d.) A useful analysis of literacy statistics for countries where these are available (mainly 'under-developed' countries, but excluding most colonial territories), with a chapter on methods of measuring the progress of literacy, graphs showing this progress, and a chapter on international comparisons. The USSR is not included, the U.S.A. and South Africa are.

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CORRESPONDENCE

Black Argosy.

Sir,—With reference to your generous review of my novel *Black Argosy* by Dr. Olumbe Bassir, there is one error which might be confusing to my listeners in West Africa. I have never taken part in the *Monthly News-letter* to which Dr. Bassir refers, but do a personal weekly *Diary* which deals with general news, political and social events, the arts and entertainments which concern West Africa in London, and sometimes elsewhere. I met Dr. Bassir when he was doing the W.A.S.U. news-letter (now discontinued) and that is probably how the confusion arose.

In regard to Dr. Bassir's comment on the African background in the book, I should like to say that Yoruba men from Ibadan have written to say how accurate the mystic ceremonies and folklore are that I include in the story. This is no credit to me but to the Yoruba man to whom the book is dedicated, who read, corrected and passed my original manuscript.

Yours sincerely,

London, W.6.

Mercedes Mackay.

(Continued from page 7)

like the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. Alliance in the Federation and the Progressive Party in Singapore, are likely to sweep the board when elections are held. The economic interests of their middle-class leaders are not likely to lead to the adoption of radical social and economic policies antagonistic to British interests. In contrast, socialism is still too much under police surveillance to be able to capture much support. The struggling Malayan labour movement is therefore faced by a dilemma. If it joins the middle-class Alliance group in order to hasten self-government, it may ultimately find it has merely exchanged one set of masters for another. If it opposes the Alliance, it may eventually find it has retarded self-government without necessarily accelerating social and economic reform. This is the dilemma at present facing the Pan-Malayan Labour Party which is both attracted and repelled by the right-wing Alliance's campaign for self-government. The crucial question Malayan socialists have to ask themselves is how much socialism can be achieved in a non-self-governing Malaya?

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